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Abstract 
This paper examines whether trade credit as a credible signal about firm’s creditworthiness to 
banks facilitates provision of bank credit to the firms receiving trade credit. Using data on 
Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 1990-1995, we find that firms receiving trade 
credit are provided short-term credit by less-informed banks. Consequently, in the firms that 
have arm’s-length relations with banks, trade credit plays an important role in mitigating 
asymmetric information problems between firms and banks, thereby facilitating extension of 
bank credit. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Trade credit is considered an important short-term source of funding, and there are 
theoretical and empirical explanations for the roles played by trade credit. In particular, some 
previous studies show that firms facing the difficulty in raising bank credit use trade credit as 
a substitute (Nilsen, 2002; Mateut et al. 2006).  
On the other hand, trade credit plays a role in offering information about firm’s 
creditworthiness to banks. Suppliers accumulate information about financial health of buyers 
through frequent selling activities, and then are likely to provide credit to the solvent buyers 
through trade credit. Moreover, suppliers have a comparative advantage over banks in 
gathering financial information about buyers (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Thus, provision of 
trade credit is a credible signal about firm’s creditworthiness to banks, and then provides 
banks with incentives to extend credit to the firms receiving trade credit. Indeed, Biais and 
Gollier (1997) argue that banks observing the provision of trade credit by suppliers have 
incentives to extend credit to the buyers about which they would otherwise have limited 
information. In addition, Giannetti et al. (2008) show that firms previously receiving trade 
credit are affiliated with a large number of distant banks for short-term periods and are 
offered lower fees for obtaining bank loans. However, these studies present no evidence of 
direct linkage between trade credit and bank credit. 
This paper examines whether trade credit as a credible signal about firm’s 
creditworthiness to banks facilitates provision of bank credit to the firms receiving trade 
credit. As previous studies suggest, the role played by trade credit as a credible signal about 
firm’s creditworthiness could be associated with relations between banks and borrowers, and 
borrowing terms. If trade credit is a credible signal about borrower’s creditworthiness, such 
information is more valuable for banks that have arm’s-length relations with borrowers 
because the banks are less informed about borrower’s creditworthiness. Moreover, extension 
of trade credit on a short-term basis could signify borrower’s creditworthiness in the 
short-term. Given the discussion above, we propose the hypothesis that if trade credit is a 
credible signal about firm’s creditworthiness to banks, banks provide short-term credit to the 
firms receiving trade credit when the firms have arm’s-length relations with banks. 
Using data on Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 1990-1995, we find that 
when firms having arm’s-length relations with banks receive trade credit, banks provide 
short-term credit to the firms receiving trade credit. Moreover, we find no significant 
relations between trade credit and short-term bank credit in the firms that have strong 
relations with banks. The results are consistent with the view that the extension of trade 
credit by suppliers is considered a credible signal about borrower’s creditworthiness by 
1 
 
less-informed banks, and then banks offer short-term credit to the borrowers receiving trade 
credit. Consequently, in the firms that have arm’s-length relations with banks, trade credit 
plays an important role in mitigating asymmetric information problems between firms and 
banks, thereby facilitating extension of bank credit. 
 
2. Data 
 
Our sample includes 747 Japanese manufacturing firms listed on the stock exchange 
over the period 1990-1995 and with fiscal years ending in March. Data on financial 
statements for sample firms come from the Nikkei Needs dataset. 
We use data on Japanese firms in the early 1990s because a distinction is easily made 
between firms that develop strong relations with banks and firms that do not: keiretsu group 
firms and independent firms. Keiretsu groups are bank-centered groups in which member 
firms have strong relations with banks centered at groups and with other same group banks. 
These strong connections reduce asymmetric information problems between firms and banks. 
In contrast, independent firms that are not affiliated with bank-centered groups have 
arm's-length relations with banks. Thus, asymmetric information problems between firms 
and banks are more severe in independent firms than keiretsu group firms.1 However, in the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s, bankruptcy of banks, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
among unhealthy banks resulted into the weakening of bank-firm ties among keiretsu groups. 
Therefore, data on Japanese firms in the early 1990s are suitable for distinguishing between 
keiretsu group firms and independent firms. Our focus here is on the keiretsu group firms 
that are associated with one of eight keiretsu groups (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, 
Dai-ichi Kangyo, Sanwa, IBJ, and Tokai) and independent firms that are not affiliated with 
eight keiretsu groups. Sample firms include 298 keiretsu group firms and 449 independent 
firms. Identification of keiretsu group membership comes from Industrial Groupings in 
Japan. 
Our dependent variable is Short-term bank loans. This is defined as the change in 
short-term loans to the firm by private banks from year t-1 to year t relative to total assets in 
year t-1. Data on loans by private banks are obtained from the Nikkei Needs Bank Loan Data. 
A list of private banks includes city banks, trust banks, long-term credit banks, first-tier 
regional banks, and second-tier regional banks. 
Among independent variables, our key variable is Trade payables. If trade payables act 
as a credible signal about firm’s creditworthiness, and provide less-informed banks with 
incentives to lend to the firms receiving trade credit, we expect the coefficient on this 
                                                  
1 For detailed discussions about keiretsu groups in Japan, see, e.g., Hoshi et al. (1991). 
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variable for independent firms to be positive. This is defined as the ratio of accounts and 
notes payable to total assets. We need to control for other firm characteristics. Return on 
Assets (ROA) is intended to control for profit performance and loan demand, and is defined 
as the ratio of pre-tax income to total assets. Trade receivables is included to capture the 
firm’s ability to extend credit to the buyers, and is defined as the ratio of accounts and notes 
receivable to total assets. Debt is intended to control for dependence on external funds, and 
is defined as the ratio of loans (short- and long-term loans) and corporate bonds (straight, 
convertible, and warrant bonds) to total assets. Tangible assets is intended to capture the 
effects of collateralizable assets on bank lending, and is defined as the ratio of tangible assets 
to total assets. Firm size is included to help control for the difference in firm size, and is 
measured by the logarithm of total assets. Cash is intended to control for internal funds, and 
is defined as the ratio of cash and deposits to total assets. Sales is intended to control for loan 
demand and growth opportunity. This is measured as the change in sales from year t-1 to 
year t relative to sales in year t-1. 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for the sets of observations of 
keiretsu group firms and independent firms. To ensure the robustness of our results, we 
remove observations with extreme values from our sample.2  
 
3. Results 
 
Table 2 reports regression estimates for keiretsu group firms and independent firms. To 
avoid endogeneity problems, our specifications include one period lagged values of the 
independent variables except for Firm size. The coefficients are estimated using the fixed 
effects model. Because of the removal of observations with extreme values, number of 
observations varies with equations.  
In first column, Trade payables have no significant coefficient, suggesting that trade 
payables play no role in inducing bank credit to keiretsu group firms. Banks centered at 
keiretsu groups are well informed about member firm’s creditworthiness through monitoring 
activities. Information about creditworthiness may not be important for such well-informed 
banks. In contrast, in second column, the coefficient on Trade payables is significantly 
positive. The result is consistent with the notion that the extension of trade credit by 
suppliers is considered a credible signal about borrower’s creditworthiness by less-informed 
banks, and then banks offer short-term credit to the borrowers receiving trade credit in the 
subsequent year. 
                                                  
2 Extreme observations are defined as those for which any one of the variables has a value that is more than 
four standard deviations away from the mean value. 
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Results in Table 2 support the view that trade credit as a credible signal about firm’s 
creditworthiness to banks facilitates provision of short-term bank credit to the firms 
receiving trade credit when the firms have arm’s-length relations with banks. However, if the 
error terms are serially correlated, our specification faces endogeneity problems. 
Furthermore, we need to examine whether the coefficient on Trade payables is larger for 
independent firms than for keiretsu group firms. 
To address the problems, Table 3 shows additional results. Keiretsu group is a dummy 
variable that have a value of 1 if the firms are associated with one of eight keiretsu groups, 
and 0 otherwise. Independent group is a dummy variable that have a value of 1 if the firms 
are not associated with the keiretsu groups, and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients in 
first column are identical to those in Table 1. Although the coefficient on interaction term of 
Trade payables with Keiretsu group is not significant, the coefficient on interaction term of 
Trade payables with Independent group is significantly positive. Test discussed by 
Wooldridge (2002) indicates that the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation in the 
error term is not rejected at the conventional levels, suggesting that our specification 
overcome endogeneity problems. When we compare the coefficients on Trade payables, the 
difference in the coefficients is significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the coefficient 
on Trade payables is larger for independent firms than for keiretsu group firms. To check the 
robustness of our results, second column contains the results with different specification. 
This yields similar results to those in first column. The null hypothesis of equality of the 
coefficients on Trade payables is rejected at the 10% level. In unreported results, we find no 
significant relations between trade credit and long-term bank credit in both keiretsu group 
firms and independent firms. Trade credit as short-term credit could indicate short-term 
creditworthiness of borrowers, but may be an inadequate signal for long-term 
creditworthiness. As a consequence, our results provide support for the view that when firms 
having arm’s-length relations with banks receive trade credit, banks provide short-term credit 
to the firms receiving trade credit.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates whether trade credit as a credible signal about firm’s 
creditworthiness to banks facilitates provision of bank credit to the firms receiving trade 
credit. Using data on Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 1990-1995, empirical 
analyses reveal that when firms having arm’s-length relations with banks receive trade credit, 
banks provide short-term credit to the firms receiving trade credit. Consequently, in the firms 
that have arm’s-length relations with banks, trade credit plays an essential role in mitigating 
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asymmetric information problems between firms and banks, thereby inducing provision of 
bank credit. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Keiretsu group firms Independent firms 
Variable Mean  Std.dev. Mean  Std.dev. 
Short-term bank loans 0.002 0.032 0.002 0.032 
Trade payables 0.177 0.090 0.170 0.095 
ROA 0.029 0.036 0.033 0.044 
Trade receivables 0.260 0.094 0.253 0.098 
Debt 0.299 0.148 0.250 0.165 
Tangible assets 0.279 0.111 0.272 0.119 
Firm size 11.307 1.387 10.871 1.253 
Cash 0.106 0.074 0.129 0.088 
Sales 0.010 0.097 0.006 0.115 
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Table 2. Trade Credit and Bank Lending 
  Dependent variable: Short-term bank loans 
Independent variable Keiretsu group firms Independent firms 
Trade payables t-1 0.012 0.141*** 
 (0.054) (0.036) 
ROA t-1 －0.087* －0.036 
 (0.045) (0.028) 
Trade receivables t-1 －0.043 －0.094*** 
 (0.040) (0.028) 
Debt t-1 －0.172*** －0.099*** 
 (0.026) (0.017) 
Tangible assets t-1 －0.092*** 0.037 
 (0.034) (0.023) 
Firm size t 0.021* 0.016* 
 (0.011) (0.008) 
Hausman test 59.24 83.27 
R2 0.059 0.056 
No. of observations 1485 2233 
Note 
The table reports regression estimates for 298 keiretsu group firms and 449 independent firms over the 
period 1990-1995. Hausman test is a specification test of the fixed effects model versus the variance 
components model. The coefficients are estimated using the fixed effects model. All equations include 
year dummy variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Trade Credit and Bank Lending: Additional Results 
  Dependent variable: Short-term bank loans 
Independent variable 1 2 
Trade payables t-1 0.012 0.046 
×Keiretsu group (0.051) (0.053) 
ROA t-1 －0.087** －0.076* 
×Keiretsu group (0.042) (0.043) 
Trade receivables t-1 －0.043 －0.030 
×Keiretsu group (0.038) (0.041) 
Debt t-1 －0.172*** －0.171*** 
×Keiretsu group (0.024) (0.024) 
Tangible assets t-1 －0.092*** －0.085** 
×Keiretsu group (0.032) (0.035) 
Firm size t 0.021* 0.026** 
×Keiretsu group (0.011) (0.011) 
Cash t-1  0.029 
×Keiretsu group  (0.031) 
Sales t-1  －0.019 
×Keiretsu group  (0.012) 
Trade payables t-1 0.141*** 0.155*** 
×Independent group (0.038) (0.040) 
ROA t-1 －0.036 －0.031 
×Independent group (0.029) (0.031) 
Trade receivables t-1 －0.094*** －0.094*** 
×Independent group (0.029) (0.032) 
Debt t-1 －0.099*** －0.101*** 
×Independent group (0.018) (0.018) 
Tangible assets t-1 0.037 0.039 
×Independent group (0.024) (0.026) 
Firm size t 0.016* 0.015* 
×Independent group (0.008) (0.009) 
Cash t-1  0.006 
×Independent group  (0.021) 
Sales t-1  －0.006 
×Independent group  (0.009) 
Hausman test 311.78 155.64 
Wooldridge test (p-value) 0.181 0.116 
R2 0.101 0.061 
No. of observations 3718 3680 
Note 
The table reports regression estimates for 298 keiretsu group firms and 449 independent firms over the period 1990-1995. Hausman test is a 
specification test of the fixed effects model versus the variance components model. The coefficients are estimated using the fixed effects model. 
Wooldridge test is a test of serial correlation in the error terms. All equations include interaction terms of year dummy variables with group 
dummy variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
